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HOFSTRA lAW REVIEW
Volume 17, No. 3

Spring 1989

INDIVIDUAL WORTH
Alan B. Handler*
DIG-NI-TY... n.... 1: the quality or state of being worthy: intrinsic
worth ....

I
I.

INTRODUCTION

A surprising number of intense human dramas have recently
played on the judicial stage. In the guise of court decisions, they
have presented very poignant themes, involving the most sensitive
kinds of personal concerns-procreation, birth, health, survival, and
dying. What seems unusual about all of this is not the drama of
these episodes but that they have been produced and directed by
courts.
In view of the thematic concerns of these litigated dramas, it is
no wonder that courts have gone well beyond the firm ground of set* Associate Justice, New Jersey Supreme Court; A.B., Princeton University, 1953; LL.B.,
Harvard University, 1956.
This Article is adapted from a lecture delivered by Justice Handler on October 6, 1988, at

the Distinguished Visitors Series, The Faculty of Law of the University of Manitoba at Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.
1. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 632 (1986).

2. The New Jersey Supreme Court has always been at the forefront of bioethical issues.
See, e.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984) (recognizing a cause of action
for wrongful life); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) (approving sterilization of

an adult female with Down's Syndrome); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979)
(recognizing a cause of action for wrongful birth); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647
(allowing a court-appointed guardian to refuse extraordinary life-sustaining medical treatment), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Accordingly, the major focus of this article is New

Jersey case law.
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tled law. Many of these decisions appear to rest more on precarious
tenets of social policy and individual morality than familiar legal
foundations.3 Among the most visible of these are the right-to-die
cases.4 Also in this theater of law are cases involving wrongful birth
and wrongful life, 5 informed consent with respect to critical medical
treatment,6 organ donation,7 and sterilization of the mentally handicapped. 8 Each case dramatizes deep dilemmas reflecting the human
condition. In recent right-to-die cases, courts have struggled with the
issue of whether a decision can be made to terminate medical treatment when this will inevitably bring about a person's death.9 The
underlying question in these cases is: When does such a decision
verge on unlawful killing? In other cases courts have dealt with such
questions as: How do we treat the deprivation of one's choice to continue or end a pregnancy involving a congenitally defective fetus? 0
Following birth, how should the interests of the defective child and
its parents be addressed?11 Under what circumstances can a deceased person's organs be removed and given to others, and if so, are
there any considerations relating to the deceased person, as well as
the surviving family, that outweigh the interests of institutions seeking the organs for the wellbeing of others?1" Should a chronically
mentally handicapped person be sterilized? Can we ever determine
whether this will diminish or enhance that person's life? 13 Is the
treatment of developmentally disabled persons compatible with their
constitutional and other legal rights? In variant forms, all of these
cases have forced courts to confront the meaning of individual worth
in a technologically advanced society. Consequently, these cases pose
difficult jurisprudential questions: Have courts decided these issues
3. See, e.g., Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 111, 337 S.E.2d 528, 533-34 (1985)
(noting that courts which allow recovery for wrongful birth "take a step into entirely untraditional analysis .... " (emphasis in original)).
4. See infra notes 54-108 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 26-53 and accompanying text; see also Procanik,97 N.J. at 347-48,
478 A.2d 760 (1984) (defining wrongful life and wrongful birth).
6. See infra notes 53-131 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text (discussing Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 109 N.J. 523, 538 A.2d 346 (1988)).
8. See infra notes 139-53 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 53-108 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 26-52 (discussing the validity of wrongful birth and wrongful life
causes of action); see also Botkin, The Legal Concept of Wrongful Life, 259 J. A.M.A. 1541,
1541-43 (1988) (providing the legal history of wrongful life).
11. See infra notes 26-43.
12. See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 139-54 and accompanying text.
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with solutions that fall beyond the bounds of established law and, in
addressing the moral and policy issues, have they espoused a philosophy of individualism that should be clearly identified and expressed?
Current judicial experience reveals that courts have had to deal
with perplexing and controversial policy and moral issues."4 Addressing these issues, courts have drawn on established law but, inescapably, have had to consider decisional grounds influenced strongly by
principles of public policy as well as moral values. 5 In particular,
courts have been forced to explore philosophical concepts of individualism or individual worth. The cases disclose that courts have come
to focus on individual worth as embracing personal autonomy, that
is, the right in each individual to self-determination and personal
choice."' The cases also suggest that individual worth encompasses
another fundamental interest: dignity and the concomitant right to
be free from the intrusion of others.17 Although originating from
common law 8 and constitutional notions of rights of privacy,1 9 the
judicial perception of individual worth is not always clearly or aptly
explained. It is, nonetheless, manifested in both the courts' exposition of individual worth and in the legal solutions adopted to protect
the interests that comprise individual worth. These cases also raise
questions concerning the role and function of the courts. Have courts
14. See Handler, Social Dilemmas, Judicial (Ir)resolutions, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1
(1987) (discussing the new challenges faced by courts when dealing with right-to-die, wrongful
birth, and wrongful life cases).
15. For example, the difficult moral choice of avoiding the birth of a defective child by
aborting the fetus belongs to the potential parents. See Roe v. Wade, 470 U.S. 113, 116
(1973). In Roe, the Supreme Court noted that "one's exposure to the raw edges of human
existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes towards life and family and their values and
the moral standards one establishes and seek to observe, are all likely to incluence and to color
.. . conclusions about abortion." Id. at 116. There remains, however, questions of whether
public policy and morality confers upon potential parents the right to prevent, either before or
after conception, the birth of a defective child. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 98 Wash. 2d 460,
472, 656 P.2d 483, 491 (1983). These decisions raise the question of whether "these developments [are] the first steps towards a 'Fascist-Orwellian societal attitude of genetic purity,' or
Huxley's brave new world? Or do they provide positive benefits to individual families and to all
society by avoiding the vast emotional and economic costs of defective children?" Id. (citation
omitted).
16. See infra notes 26-40 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' focus on the
right of an individual to self-determination and personal choice in the context of wrongful life,
and right-to-die cases).
17. See infra notes 132-54 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' concern with
an individual's interest in dignity and privacy).
18. See infra notes 66-87 and accompanying text (discussing right-to-die cases where
the critical interest is the basic common law right of self-determination).
19. See infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text (discussing right-to-die cases where
the critical interest is a constitutional right to privacy).
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stretched judicial authority beyond acceptable limits?2" Have courts
acted as a social arbiter deciding controversial matters of policy and
morality that are better left to others?
The courts' decisions, while innovative, are cast for the most
part in the conventional judicial adjudicatory mode. In a traditional
sense, courts have done nothing more than treat these cases as controversies properly brought before them by contesting litigants. In
this setting, courts act on the belief that law embodies a societal
consensus on how certain factual situations should be handled. This
traditional approach, however, vanishes when the facts of a case go
beyond the existing societal consensus. In such cases the courts act

alone against a background of uncertainty and disagreement. In the
cases that have attracted our attention, courts have decided disputes

with strong moral overtones providing solutions which purport to settle questions that society itself has not yet answered.2" Courts have
proferred judicial answers to these dilemmas, at the same time acknowledging the responsibility of others in these matters. In these
cases courts have not pursued the role of social arbiter, but of social
catalyst.
II.

JUDICIAL PERCEPTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL WORTH

The right-to-die22 and wrongful birth2 s and wrongful life2' cases
20. See Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 116, 337 S.E.2d 528, 536 (1985); see
also Handler, supra note 14, at 3 (arguing that right-to-die cases "challenge the [courts']
competency . . . by straining classical techniques and categories of legal reasoning; and by
testing the institutional flexibility of the judiciary."). The Supreme Court of North Carolina
noted in Azzolino that:
claims for wrongful life and wrongful birth can be resolved properly only by a legislative body. They have not been and will not be resolved properly by courts attempting to apply "traditional" tort notions which simply do not fit or which courts steadfastly refuse to apply with full vigor.
Azzolino, 315 N.C. at 116, 337 S.E.2d at 536.
21. An example is the question of whether life, despite severe and debilitating deformity,
is better than non-life. Compare Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (finding a
valid cause of action based on a wrongful birth claim) and Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing a wrongful
life cause of action in tort) with Bruggeman v. Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 718 P.2d 635 (1986)
(refusing to recognize a wrongful life cause of action) and Azzolino, 315 N.C. at 103, 337
S.E.2d at 528 (refusing to recognize wrongful life and wrongful birth causes of action).
22. See infra notes 54-108 and accompanying text.
23. Wrongful birth is an action in tort by the parents of a deformed child to recover for
negligent failure to allow an informed choice concerning the continuance of pregnancy. See
Berman, 80 N.J. at 431-34, 404 A.2d at 14-15. Instances where a wrongful birth cause of
action may arise are: negligent counseling, see Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 638 F. Supp. 979
(M.D.N.C. 1986), failure to mention the value of an amniocentesis test, see Berman, 80 N.J.
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deal with matters of intense human concern that uniquely touch our
deepest feelings as persons. An initial and primary focus on these
two groups of cases as examples of our themes--cases involving the
right to create life and the right to end life-are both instructive and
appropriate. As Professor Laurence Tribe observed, "[o]f all decisions a person makes about his or her body, the most profound and
intimate relate to two sets of ultimate questions: first, whether, when,
and how one's body is to become the vehicle for another human being's creation; second, when and how-this time there is no question
of 'whether'-one's body is to terminate its organic life." 2
Recent wrongful birth and wrongful life decisions from New
Jersey are illustrative of these profound judicial dilemmas. In
Berman v. Allan,2" a physician failed to exercise reasonable care by
not informing his patients, an expectant mother and her husband, of
the need to undergo amniocentesis, a diagnostic procedure that
would serve to determine whether the fetus was congenitally defective.217 The couple allowed the pregnancy to go to term ignorant of
the availability of such a test and the information it would reveal.2 8
Thereafter, their baby was born with Down's Syndrome. 2 In
Schroeder v. Perkel,3 0 for four years the attending physician failed
to diagnose a child as having cystic fibrosis.3 1 During the delay in
diagnosis, the parents chose to conceive another child.3 2 Unfortuat 422-26, 404 A.2d at 9-10, and a negligently performed vasectomy or abortion, see Speck v.
Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981).
24. Wrongful life is an action in tort by the child, claiming that "but for" the negligence
of a doctor or medical professional, the child would not have been born to endure the suffering
associated with its deformity. Azzolino, 315 N.C. at 107, 337 S.E.2d at 533. Wrongful life
claims, where recognized, are denied when there is a lack of true tort causation, see Wilson v.
Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), difficulty in calculating the value of life in an
impaired state versus nonexistence, see Bruggeman, 239 Kan. at 245, 718 P.2d at 635, or lack
of a legally cognizable injury, see Goldberg v. Ruskin, 113 Ill.
2d 482, 499 N.E.2d 406 (1986).
These problems can be avoided, however, by allowing recovery in wrongful life claims for
diminished parenting suffered by injury to the child. See Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 35860, 478 A.2d 755, 766 (1984) (Handler, J., concurring).
25. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 1337-38 (2d ed. 1988).
26.

80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).

27. Id. at 426, 404 A.2d at 11.
28. Id.
29. Id. Down's Syndrome is a "genetic defect commonly referred to as mongolism." Id.
at 424, 404 A.2d at 10.
30. 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981).
31. Id. at 59-60, 432 A.2d at 836-37. Cystic fibrosis is one of the most fatal genetic
diseases in the United States. The disease is carried as a recessive gene and there is a 25%
probability for two carrier parents to have an afflicted child. Id. at 58, 432 A.2d at 836.
32. Id. at 60, 432 A.2d at 837.
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nately, the mother was in her eighth month of pregnancy with her
second child when the diagnosis was made thus preventing the parents from making an informed choice as to whether they should have
assumed the risk of conceiving another child. 3 Tragically, the second child also developed cystic fibrosis. 4 In Procanik v. Cillo,35 a
mother who was exposed to German measles early in her pregnancy
was not properly diagnosed and, therefore, not advised by her physician of the congenital risk to her fetus or the desirability of amniocentesis to determine its condition. 6 Without this necessary counselling, the mother gave birth to a child
with the terribly severe
37
defect of congenital rubella syndrome.
In none of these cases was the physician at fault for causing the
particular congenital defect. In each case, however, the physician
was remiss in not having given the parents available information
concerning the genetic risks to their unborn children, and the opportunity either to terminate the pregnancy or to prepare for an acutely
distressing birth and life.38 In these cases, the New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled that the negligence of the physician deprived the mother
of the opportunity to decide whether or not to initiate or continue
her pregnancy., 9 The court concluded that the negligent deprivation
of this opportunity was wrongful, and stressed that the critical individual interest that had been violated was that of personal choice
belonging to the parents.40 Further, the court held that this
wrong-the deprivation of choice-was protectable and compensable. 41 In Berman, the court determined that damages could be
33.

Id.

34. Id.
35. 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984); see Comment, Right Not To Be Born-New
Jersey Becomes the Third State to Recognize Wrongful Life as a Cause of Action, 15 SETON
HALL L. REv. 880 (1985) (authored by Rollin A. Steams, Jr.).
36. Procanik, 97 N.J. at 343-44, 478 A.2d at 758.
37. Id. at 344, 478 A.2d at 758.
38. See id. at 343, 478 A.2d at 758; Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 64-66, 432 A.2d
834, 839-40 (1981); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 426, 404 A.2d 8, 11 (1979).
39. Procanik, 97 N.J. at 344, 478 A.2d at 758; Schroeder, 87 N.J. at 64-66, 432 A.2d
at 839-40; Berman, 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.

40. See Procanik,97 N.J. at 345-47, 478 A.2d at 759-60 (analyzing the development of
parents' rights to make an informed decision to conceive or terminate a pregnancy within New
Jersey).
41. Schroeder, 87 N.J. at 67-68, 432 A.2d at 840-41; Berman, 80 N.J. at 434, 404 A.2d
at 15; cf. Procanik,97 N.J. at 355-56, 478 A.2d at 764. In Procanik,the court recognized that
a wrongful birth cause of action was compensable, but held that the parents were time-barred
from bringing the cause of action. Id. Moreover, even if they were not time barred, recovery
for extraordinary expenses would not have been permitted since the infant was previously
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awarded based on the emotional distress of the parents,"2 and in
Schroeder the court also permitted recovery for the special and extraordinary medical expenses of the parents necessary to care for the
handicapped child.4 a
The significance of these decisions is underscored when they are
contrasted with Gleitman v. Cosgrove," an influential earlier case
decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The court in Gleitman
inferred that it was malpractice for a doctor to fail to inform a pregnant patient of her option to continue or terminate a pregnancy
where it was a certainty or strong probability that the unborn child
would be congenitally defective.45 The court ruled, however, the
wrong was not legally cognizable because it was not against public
policy."' The majority held the wrong could not be recognized because there was no legal right to terminate a pregnancy through
abortion. 7 In addition, the wrong could not be recognized because
the court believed damages were impossible to ascertain. 8 Determining damages would require a comparison between existence and nonexistence, between no life at all and an impaired life, a judgment
beyond the ken of the court.49
These cases are examples of the judicial treatment of a
profound human dilemma, involving the moral choice of whether one
should create new life when that life will be seriously defective. It is,
therefore, hardly surprising that litigation involving issues of wrongful life and wrongful birth stir controversy and polarize opinion.
Consequently, some courts have denied wrongful birth or wrongful
life claims because they continue to view the obstacles raised by
Gleitman as insurmountable. 50 Other courts have deferred to legislaawarded these expenses. Id.
42. Berman, 80 N.J. at 434, 404 A.2d at 15.
43. Schroeder, 87 N.J. at 70-71, 432 A.2d at 842.
44. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
45. Id. at 24-26, 227 A.2d at 690-91.
46. Id. at 28-31, 227 A.2d at 692-93.
47. Id. at 30-31, 227 A.2d at 693.
48. Id. The court in Gleitman stated that the "intangible, unmeasurable, and complex
human benefits of parenting made it impossible to measure the damages to the parents of a
child born with birth defects." Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 693.
49. Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
50. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 233, 643 P.2d 954, 962, 182 Cal. Rptr.
337, 345 (1982) (stating that "at least in some situations-public policy supports the right of
each individual to make his or her own determination as to the relative value of life and
death."); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337, 533 S.E.2d 528 (1985) (holding that
wrongful birth claims shall not be recognized unless the legislature clearly states their intention to recognize such actions), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1987); cf. Becker v. Schwartz, 46
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tures as a better forum for dealing with such causes of action." Nev-

ertheless, while many jurisdictions have rejected either wrongful
birth and/or wrongful life claims, all that have considered it have
struggled mightily with its perplexing legal and moral issues. 2
N.Y.2d 401, 411-13, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812-13, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900-01 (1978) (dismissing a
wrongful life action because there was no legally cognizable injury to the infant and validating
a wrongful birth action but denying recovery for the parents' pain and suffering).
51. Most legislation disallows actions which seek damages for wrongful life and wrongful birth. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130 (Vernon
1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (West 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-55-2
(Supp. 1986). But see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(3) (1986) (permitting damages for wrongful life and wrongful birth actions); see also Note, Wrongfid Birth Actions: The
Case Against Legislative Curtailment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2017 (1987) (criticizing the constitutionality of wrongful birth statutes).
52. Many jurisdictions have addressed the issues of wrongful life and wrongful birth.
See Alabama, Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978) (dismissing action for wrongful life
because of the difficulties associated with the question of life versus non-life); California, Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 220, 643 P.2d at 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 337 (allowing recovery for wrongful
birth action and permitting recovery in wrongful life action for extraordinary medical expenses
if parents do not have overlapping recovery); Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal.
App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980) (recognizing action for wrongful life based on a
breach of a duty of care); Colorado, Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 746 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988)
(allowing recovery for extraordinary expenses in wrongful birth claim but disallowing wrongful
life action); Connecticut, Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982) (recognizing
wrongful birth cause of action and allowing recovery for mother's pain and suffering during
birth and ordinary expenses associated with raising the child); Delaware, Coleman v. Garrison,
349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) (denying recovery for wrongful life action since damages were too
speculative); District of Columbia, Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1987) (recognizing recovery for extraordinary medical expenses in wrongful birth suit); Florida, Fassoulas
v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984) (allowing recovery for extraordinary medical expenses
in wrongful birth action); Georgia, Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314
S.E.2d 653 (1984) (recognizing wrongful birth action and allowing special damages); Idaho,
IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (Supp. 1986) (prohibiting wrongful birth actions); Illinois, Siemieniec v.
Lutheran General Hosp., 117 II1. 230, 512 N.E.2d 691 (1987) (permitting recovery for wrongful birth action with damages limited to extraordinary medical expenses during child's minority; denying wrongful life action and denying recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress in wrongful birth action); Goldberg v. Ruskin, 113 I11.2d 482, 499 N.E.2d 406 (1986)
(denying cause of action for wrongful life); Kansas, Bruggeman v. Schimke, 239 Kan. 245,
718 P.2d 635 (1986) (declining to recognize a wrongful life action because the measure of
damages necessitates performing a calculation between life in an impaired state and nonexistence); Kentucky, Schork v. Huber, 698 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983) (holding that the benefits
of the child's existence outweighed any economic burdens of raising the child the issue should,
nonetheless, be given to the legislature); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(3)
(1986) (limiting damages for the birth of an unhealthy child born as the result of professional
negligence to injuries associated with the disease, defect, or handicap suffered by the child);
Maryland, Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984) (allowing recovery for
costs of raising the child less any benefits associated with raising the child); Michigan, Proffitt
v. Bartolo, 162 Mich. App. 35, 412 N.W.2d 232 (1987) (recognizing wrongful birth cause of
action but refusing to recognize wrongful life cause of action); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106
Mich. App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981) (rejecting wrongful life action where child's damages were not legally cognizable); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (West 1989)
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Decisions that have allowed some kind of recovery have unmistakably acknowledged the "right of individual autonomy that involves personal choice and self-determination" as the singular indi(prohibiting both wrongful birth and wrongful life actions); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. §
188.130 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (prohibiting wrongful life cause of action); New Hampshire,
Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 513 A.2d 341 (1986) (allowing recovery for extraordinary damages in wrongful birth actions but denying recovery for wrongful life actions); New Jersey,
Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984) (allowing recovery for extraordinary
medical expenses in wrongful life actions); Berman v. Allan, 80, N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979)
(recognizing a cause of action for wrongful birth); New York, Bani-Esraili v. Lerman, 69
N.Y.2d 807, 505 N.E.2d 947, 513 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1987) (deciding that since there is no legal
obligation to continue support past the child's majority, parents were only permitted to recover
for injury and not the extraordinary costs during the child's adult life); Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (recognizing cause of action for
wrongful birth, but rejecting damages for pain and suffering of parents and wrongful life action because of the difficulty ascertaining damages); North Carolina, Gallagher v. Duke Univ.,
638 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (recognizing a limited type of wrongful birth action);
Pennsylvania, Ellis v. Sherman, 512 Pa. 14, 515 A.2d 1327 (1986) (refusing to recognize
wrongful life action); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (recognizing wrong
ful birth actions but affirming denial of wrongful life action by an equally divided court);
South Carolina, Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309 (D.S.C. 1983) (holding that
extraordinary costs are recoverable for a forty year life expectancy in a wrongful birth action);
South Dakota, S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN. § 21-55-2 (Supp. 1986) (prohibiting wrongful birth
actions); Texas, Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984) (holding that a wrongful birth
cause of action accrues when injury is discovered and refusing to recognize a cause of action
for wrongful life); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (allowing recovery for
extraordinary medical expenses in a wrongful birth suit partially because legal abortions were
available outside the state (prior to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but rejecting damages
for pain and suffering of the parents and recovery for emotional distress); Utah, UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-11-24 (Supp. 1986) (prohibiting wrongful birth actions); Virginia, Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982) (recognizing recovery for a wrongful birth action;
allowing recovery for all care and treatment of a deformed child with an extremely shortened
lifespan and emotional distress to the parents because of the certainty of the child's injury);
Washington, Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (allowing damages for parents' emotional distress throughout child's life in a wrongful birth suit, but refusing to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because the measure of damages necessitated
performing a calculation between life in an impaired state and nonexistence); West Virginia,
James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985) (refusing to allow recovery for ordinary
childbearing expenses in a wrongful pregnancy action); Jennifer S. v. Kirdnual, 332 S.E.2d
872 (W. Va. 1985) (holding that parents will not be made whole by limiting recovery to minority age since the child will not be self-sufficient at the age of majority, and refusing to
recognize actions for wrongful life); Wisconsin, Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766,
233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (recognizing wrongful birth actions but not wrongful life actions and
finding doctor was not negligent for failing to advise the mother of the availability of an abortion). See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 370-73 (5th ed.
1984); Botkin, supra note 10, at 1541; Note, supra note 51 (discussing the issue of wrongful
birth actions and arguing that legislation restricting these actions may be unconstitutional);
Weisman, No More Guarantees of a Son's Birth, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1988, at Al, col. 2
(discussing legislation prohibiting the usej of amniocentesis in order to determine fetal sex and
facilitate abortion).
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vidual right at stake.5 3 The significance of personal choice with
respect to the creation of life should suggest that at the opposite end
of life's spectrum, when life terminates, personal choice is just as
important.
One of the first contemporary right-to-die cases, In re Karen
Ann Quinlan,54 addressed the issue of an individual's right to end
life. In Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the
plight of a young woman in an irreversible, comatose, and vegetative
condition. Her life was sustained by a respirator. 5 The question
arose whether, at the request of the woman's parents, the doctor and
hospital could disconnect the respirator without incurring criminal or
civil liability for the patient's inevitable death. 6 The court addressed
this issue in terms of the patient's right of privacy.
In its formulation of the privacy issue, the court in Quinlan was
influenced by the Supreme Court's decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut 58 and Roe v. Wade.5 9 In these two cases, the Supreme Court
ruled that an individual had a constitutional right of privacy that
included the right of self-determination and personal choice over
matters concerning procreation and pregnancy-the creation of
life.60 The court in Quinlan concluded that the individual's constitutional right of privacy, encompassing personal choice in matters concerning the creation of life, also extended to a personal choice concerning the termination of life. 1 Privacy that encompassed dominion
over one's body included the right to refuse medical treatment relating directly to survival itself. 62 The court in Quinlan then sought to
53. Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 364, 478 A.2d 755, 769 (1984) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see infra notes 54-108 and accompanying text (discussing
judicial decisions recognizing a right to individual autonomy involving personal choice and

self-determination).
54. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
55. Id. at 23-25, 355 A.2d at 654-55.
56. Id. at 51-52, 355 A.2d at 669-70.
57. Id. at 38-42, 355 A.2d at 662-64
58. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold is the seminal constitutional decision involving personal choice with respect to procreation. The Supreme Court ruled that a married couple had
the right not to procreate or conceive, in effect, not to initiate a pregnancy. Id. at 485-86. This
right was subsequently extended to unmarried individuals. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
59. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the Court recognized that the right of privacy, with
respect to procreation, encompassed the right to choose whether to have an abortion, in effect,
to terminate or discontinue a pregnancy. Id. at 152-56.
60. Id. at 154; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
61. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.

62. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
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determine how the right of individual choice could be effectuated
when the individual was incapable of making any decision or exercising any control over her own body.63 In the court's view, the right of
choice would be lost if it were not exercised. 4 Thus, because Karen
Ann Quinlan could not exercise her individual privacy right, the
court delegated that right to her father who, as her guardian, could
make the decision for his daughter and thereby vindicate her right of
65
choice.
As later commentary has pointed out, the court in Quinlan
spoke of the individual right in terms of constitutional privacy, viewing privacy primarily as the right of personal choice or self-determination.66 In a subsequent case, In re Conroy,67 the New Jersey Supreme Court also viewed the critical individual interest to be that of
self-determination, but clarified the legal basis of the right.68 The
patient in Conroy was an elderly woman in a semi-conscious state
with irreversible physical and mental impairments. 9 Her life was being sustained through forced feeding by a nasogastric tube; death
was imminent.70 Although Ms. Conroy died while the case was pending, 71 the court decided the case and held that life-sustaining treatment could be discontinued in certain circumstances.7 The court
concluded that what was truly at stake was the fundamental right of
personal choice or self-determination. This individual right of personal choice, however, was not the constitutional right of privacy but
the basic common-law right of self-determination with respect to
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
Id. The court made clear, however, that the parents in this case were loving, trust-

worthy and unselfish persons. Id. at 54, 355 A.2d at 667. Moreover, the decision would be a
joint one involving the judgment of the hospital's "Ethics Committee." Id.
66. See L. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 15-11, at 1365-66; Moore, "Two Steps Forward,One
Step Back":An Analysis of New Jersey's Latest "Right-to-Die Decisions," 19 RUTGERS L.J.
955, 979 (1988).
67. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). See generally Note, In re Conroy: Forging a
Path to Death with Dignity, 67 B.U.L. REV. 365 (1987) (authored by Andrew Agrawal) (discussing New Jersey right-to-die cases).
68. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 346, 486 A.2d at 1221-22.
69. Id. at 337, 486 A.2d at 1217.

70. Id. at 336-37, 486 A.2d at 1216-17.
71. Id. at 342, 486 A.2d at 1219.
72. Id. at 359-60, 486 A.2d at 1229. The court stated that "life-sustaining treatment
may be withheld or withdrawn from an incompetent patient when it is clear that the particular

patient would have refused the treatment under the circumstances involved." Id. at 360, 486
A.2d at 1229.
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one's own body.7 3
In three recent New Jersey right-to-die cases, 74 the court's

thinking about this aspect of individual worth has been further clari76 a competent, dying middle-aged woman,
fied.75 In In re Farrell,
whose existence was totally helpless and hopeless, sought to die natu-

rally instead of prolonging her life artificially. 77 Although Mrs. Farrell died before the court could consider her appeal, the court ruled
that she would have had the right to choose the termination of her
life-support medical treatment. 7 The court's holding was predicated
squarely on the individual interest of self-determination protectable

as a common law right. 79 In In re Peter,0 the companion case to
Farrell,the incompetent patient was an old woman whose comatose

condition was irreversible. 8 ' Although death was not imminent, she
had previously expressed her desire to have another person make the
life-or-death decision for her. 2 The court permitted this person, acting pursuant to a trustworthy and durable power of attorney that
had been executed by the patient while competent, to decide whether

to continue or discontinue the life-support treatment. 8 The court
thereby effectuated the patient's right of self-determination.,

In the

third case, In re Jobes, 5 the court considered the plight of a young
woman in an irreversible comatose state, but whose death was not
imminent. She was kept alive through artificial respiration, hydra73. Id; cf. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988) (holding that a person, even
while incompetent, has the right to terminate life-sustaining treatment and that this right is
grounded in liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution).
74. See In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394,
529 A.2d 434 (1987); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
75. See generally Weinberg, Whose Right Is It Anyway? Individualism, Community,
and the Right to Die: A Commentary on the New Jersey Experience, 40 HASTINGs L.J. 119
(1988) (discussing the New Jersey right-to-die cases).
76. 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
77. Id. at 347, 529 A.2d at 409.
78. Id. at 345-46, 529 A.2d at 410.
79. Id. at 347, 529 A.2d at 410 (stating that every human being of adult age and of
sound mind has a right to determine what is done with their own body (citing Schloendorff v.
Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (Cardozo, J.)).
80. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
81. Id. at 370-72, 529 A.2d at 421-22.
82. Id. at 371, 529 A.2d at 422.
83. Id. at 384, 529 A.2d at 429.
84. Id. at 384-85, 529 A.2d at 430. The court in Peter stated that "in this case as in
every case, the ultimate decision is not for the Court. The decision is primarily that of the
patient, competent or incompetent, and for the patient's family or guardian and physician." Id.
85. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
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tion, and nutrition."8 The court permitted the termination of medical
treatment, emphasizing the patient's right of self-determination and
the need to effectuate this right.8 7
The right-to-die cases exemplify the court's perception of individual worth as encompassing the right of personal autonomy. The
significance of personal autonomy is further underscored by the
range of situations in which personal autonomy is deemed to be the
core interest that demands protection, and by the remedies that the
court develops. Thus, if the patient is competent as in Farrell, the
patient is entitled to make the decision herself, by exercising informed consent in conjunction with her physician. 8 Personal autonomy also explains why a competent person may execute a living will
or durable power of attorney that permits a surrogate decisionmaker,
who may either be the person's designee, family member or close
friend, to exercise that person's right of self-determination after he
or she has become incompetent.8 9 Finally, even when an incompetent
patient is unable to exercise intelligent, informed choice or has not
executed an "advance directive," the right of personal autonomy can
be vindicated through a decision made by other persons by a process
of substituted-judgment. 90
In Conroy, the court sought to chart these remedial paths. It
articulated a comprehensive standard for defining the substitutedjudgment methodology in the case of an incompetent person whose
wishes are unknown with respect to the continuation of life-sustaining medical treatment. 91 The primary application was called the
86. Id. at 402, 529 A.2d at 438.
87. Id. at 426-27, 529 A.2d at 453.
88. 108 N.J. at 354-59, 529 A.2d at 413-16.
89. See, e.g., In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 378-80, 529 A.2d 419, 426-27 (1987) (stating
that a living will is "a written statement that specifically explains the patient's preferences
about life-sustaining treatment"); see also THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 140, 141 (1987)
[hereinafter HASTINGS GUIDELINES] (providing that a living will is a "treatment directive" and
a durable power of attorney is "an individual's written designation of another person to act on
his or her behalf"). The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research refers to both living wills and durable powers of attorney as "advance directives." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FORGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 5 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].

90. See, e.g., Jobes, 108 N.J. at 414, 529 A.2d at 444-45 (1987); In re Conroy, 98 N.J.
321, 360-61, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985).
91. 98 N.J. at 358-68, 486 A.2d at 1228-33; see also Note, supra note 67, at 375-79
(discussing the three tests enumerated in Conroy).
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"purely-subjective" test9 2 and was intended to be followed when

there was clear and convincing evidence of the patient's preferences
that could serve as the exclusive standard for reaching a particular

decision. 93 A second standard, called a "limited-objective" test,94 depended on a combination of some trustworthy evidence of the patient's preferences and a determination based on objective factors re-

lating to the patient's condition.95 This test involved a weighing of
benefits as well as burdens, including the element of pain, in connectin with continued treatment and the prolongation of life." The
court also required that the substituted judgment be shared not only
by physicians and family members or friends but also by the Office
of the Ombudsman for the Elderly.97 The court also proffered a third
standard, the "purely-objective test." 98 This standard was to be invoked when there was no trustworthy evidence of the patient's pref-

erences, requiring only a balance of benefits and burdens relating to
the patient's objective condition. It was, in effect, a best-interests test
since a decision is made according to what is presumed to be in the
92. 98 N.J. at 360-64, 486 A.2d at 1229.
93. Id. To ascertain the wishes of a patient, the court may consider many different
sources including the execution of a living will, a patient's oral directive, a durable power of
attorney, deductions from the patient's religious beliefs and the tenets of that religion, and
inferences "from the patient's consistent pattern of conduct with respect to prior decisions
about his own medical care." Id. at 361-62, 486 A.2d at 1229-30.
The Conroy court noted that it erred in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), by disregarding evidence of statements made by Ms. Quinlan to friends concerning artificial prolongation of terminally ill patients in general. 98 N.J. at
362, 486 A.2d at 1230; see also Jarrett, Moral Reasoning and Legal Change: Observations on
the Termination of Medical Treatment and the Development of Law, 19 RUTGERs L.J. 999,
1004-06 (1988); Note, supra note 67, at 375-77.
94. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365-66, 486 A.2d at 1232.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232. The court concluded that the limited-objective standard "permits the termination of treatment for a patient who had not unequivocally expressed
his desires before becoming incompetent, when it is clear that the treatment ... would merely
prolong the patient's suffering." Id.
97. Id. at 383-84, 486 A.2d at 1241-42. The New Jersey Legislature established the
Office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly by statute in 1977. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:27G-3 (West 1986). The purpose of this agency is "to receive, investigate and resolve
complaints concerning certain health care facilities serving the elderly, and to initiate actions
to secure, preserve and promote the health, safety and welfare, and the civil and human rights
of the elderly patients, residents and clients of such facilities." Id. § 52:27G-1. In Conroy, the
New Jersey Supreme Court required that this office be notified if an incompetent patient's lifesustaining treatment is being withdrawn or withheld, treat every notification as a possible
"abuse," investigate the situation, and concur in the decision of the guardians and the doctors
before life-sustaining treatment is withheld or withdrawn. 98 N.J. at 383-84, 486 A.2d at
1241-42.
98. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 383-84, 486 A.2d at 1241-42.
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patient's "best-interest." 9

In Conroy, the court recognized that at some point, as evidence
of the patient's subjective intent becomes less trustworthy, the exercise of substituted judgment shades into a best-interests analysis. 10 0
Hence, persons purporting to exercise substituted judgment based ostensibly on the patient's preferences may, in fact, decide to terminate
the treatment on grounds indistinguishable from those based on the
best interests of the patient.' 01 Thus in Jobes, the court relied on
evidence of the patient's general personal values as revealed through
family members and friends. 10 2 The court, as it originally did in
Quinlan,0 a invoked a substituted judgment methodology, delegating
to the patient's family the right to exercise the choice on behalf of
the patient.10 4 Nevertheless, the life-sustaining treatment being administered to the patient was highly invasive; her condition was
99. Id. at 366-67, 486 A.2d at 1232. The court set forth two conditions that must be
satisfied under the purely-objective test. First, "the net burdens of the patient's life with the
treatment should clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits that the patient derives from
life." Id. Secondly, "recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life with the treatment should be such that the effect of administering life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane." Id.
100. Id. at 368, 486 A.2d at 1233.
101. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 221-22, 741 P.2d 674, 688-89
(1987); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 440-45, 529 A.2d 434, 457-60 (1987) (Handler, J.,
concurring); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 447-53, 529 A.2d 434, 461-63 (1987) (Pollock, J., concurring). But see In re Westchester County Med. Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531, 531 N.E.2d 607,
613, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892 (1988) (requiring clear and convincing evidence of a patient's
wishes to justify a decision by a substituted decision-maker to terminate life-support treatment; in the absence of such evidence the termination of life-support would not be authorized).
102. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 409-11, 529 A.2d 434, 442 (1987). This evidence consists of "the patient's prior statements about and reactions to medical issues ...with, of
course, particular reference to his or her relevant philosophical, theological and ethical values.
.." Id. at 414-15, 529 A.2d at 444; see also In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Del. Ch.
1980) (utilizing the substituted judgment test based on the incompetent patient's previously
expressed wish that "she did not want to be kept alive in a vegetative state ....
");Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 427-29, 497 N.E. 626, 631-32 (1986) (substituted
judgment based on, among other things, patient's religious convictions and his views of the
Quinlan case, including an alleged preference of refusing treatment if he was ever in Quinlan's
condition); Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 5-6, 26, 516 N.Y.S.2d
677, 681, 693 (2d Dep't 1987) (patient's views and wishes expressed repeatedly over years
were clear and convincing evidence that patient would have refused treatment); In re Grant,
109 Wash. 2d 545, 566-68, 747 P.2d 445, 456-57 (1987) (commenting that the patient's
mother believed the patient would not want to have her life sustained artificially based on the
patient's past dislike of medical treatment).
103. 70 N.J. 10, 34-35, 355 A.2d 647, 660-661, cert. denied 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
104. Jobes 108 N.J. at 412-13, 529 A.2d at 443. As the court noted in Jobes, "[t]he
term 'substituted judgment' is commonly used to desribe our approach in Quinlan." Id. at 414,
529 A.2d at 444.
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wretched.10 5 There was some acknowledgment that, even in the absence of an expression of the patient's preference, a surrogate deci-

sionmaker could properly conclude that it would be in the patient's
best interests to withdraw life-sustaining treatment under such
circumstances. O6
It is nevertheless evident that the primary, perhaps favored, as-

pect of individual worth acknowledged by the court in these cases is
personal autonomy. The substituted-judgment approach, which at-

tempts to effectuate personal autonomy, is the solution of first resort.
It draws content from the patient's wishes, views, values and life
style manifested while the patient was competent. Thus, in Jobes, as

in Quinlan, the court focused on those persons, who through personal
knowledge, informed intuition, and familiarity, could best assess the
patient's wishes, and who, by virtue of their relationship with the
patient, could most be trusted to make an unselfish decision on her

behalf.0 7 In each case the court allowed the family of the incompetent patient to act as the surrogate decisionmaker. 08
In all these right-to-die and wrongful birth and life cases, courts
have confronted the meaning of individuality; having identified personal autonomy as the primary individual interest at stake, they have
sought to clarify the right of self-determination or personal choice.
Individuality and personal autonomy, the direct impetus underlying the notions of self-determination and personal choice can be
traced in the common law doctrine of informed consent.' 0 9 In Far105. Id. at 401-04, 529 A.2d at 438 (describing the treatments administered and the
physical condition of Mrs. Jobes).
106. Id. at 441-43, 529 A.2d at 458-59 (Handler, J., concurring); Id. at 450, 529 A.2d
at 463 (Pollock, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 409-11, 529 A.2d at 442-43; Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 38-39, 355 A.2d at 663.
108. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 444-45, 529 A.2d at 447; Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at
647; see also John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla.
1984); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545. 566-68, 747 P.2d 445, 456-57 (1987) (en banc); Note,
Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: Procedures for Subjective
and Objective Surrogate Decision Making in In re Jobes, In re Peter and In re Farrell, 19
RUTGERS L.J. 1029 (1988) (authored by Renae S. McEluaine).
109. The doctrine of informed consent has been described as a "primary means developed in the law to protect ... personal interest in the integrity of one's body." In re Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, 346, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985). Under the doctrine, the physician has a duty
to disclose to a patient "information that will enable him to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each before subjecting that patient to a course of
treatment." Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 457, 457 A.2d 431, 438 (1983) (citations omitted).
In Conroy, the court recognized that the right to informed consent is significant to a patient's
ability to control bodily integrity only if the right also encompasses the right to "informed
refusal." 98 N.J. at 347, 486 A.2d at 1222; see also In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 347-48, 529
A.2d 404, 410 (1987) (discussing case law surrounding the doctrine of informed consent
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rell, the court explained that the right-to-die decision belonged to

the dying but competent patient based on her "informed consent.""'

The case parallels the California case of Bouvia v. Superior

Court,' in which the court determined that a competent person in a
condition of physical helplessness was entitled to make a personal
decision, a choice based on "informed consent," as to whether she
would continue to be fed in order to survive." 2
In jurisdictions that have acknowledged personal autonomy, it is
not entirely coincidental to find as a core interest in defining individual worth, a parallel decision that expands the related common law
principle of informed consent."13 In a recent New Jersey case,
Largey v. Rothman,"14 the court once again explained the standard

of care owed by a physician to a patient in terms of informed consent and adopted an enhanced disclosure standard for "informed
consent"

15

as articulated in the earlier and influential decision of

Canterbury v. Spence." 6 The court in Canterbury decided to change7
the duty of disclosure from one based on a "professional" standard"
to one based on the patient's wishes and needs. The court stated that

"[r]espect for the patient's right of self-determination on particular
therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than
one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves. '"18
within New Jersey).
110. 108 N.J. at 347-48, 529 A.2d at 410.
111. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
112. Id. at 1138-39, 225 Cal. Rptr at 301-02.
113. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 214-216, 741 P.2d 674, 683
(1987); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 405-07, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960); In re Gardner,
534 A.2d 947, 950 (Me. 1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 430, 497
N.E.2d 626, 633 (1986); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266
(1981). See generally Shulz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected
Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985) (discussing the doctrine of informed consent and the growth
of other related doctrines). But see Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc)
(holding that since informed consent to forego life-sustaining medical treatment cannot be
given under hypothetical circumstances, such a decision by an individual does not override the
state's interest in preserving life).
114. 110 N.J. 204, 540 A.2d 504 (1988).
115. Id. at 209-14, 540 A.2d at 507-09.
116. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
117. The majority of the jurisdictions that adopted the "professional" standard required
a physician to make disclosures that comport with prevailing medical standards in the community or "the disclosure of those risks that a reasonable physician in the community of like
training, would customarily make in similar circumstances." Largey, 110 N.J. at 209, 540
A.2d at 507. A minority of jurisdictions that adopt the "professional" standard do not utilize a
community standard but require only "such disclosures as would be made by a reasonable
medical practitioner under similar circumstances." Id.
118. Canterbury,464 F.2d at 784 (citations omitted). The court explained that the right
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In effect, this standard evidences a greater value placed on the right
of self-determination.1 19
Another aspect of individuality or individual worth, which is
distinguishable from personal autonomy, is reflected in the right-todie cases.' 20 In re Conroy 2 ' acknowledged the situation that confronted health-care providers responsible for the treatment and survival of a person whose wishes were unknowable, or a person who
was unknown.' 2 2 Logically, no decision to continue or discontinue
life-support treatment could ever be shown to fulfill that individual's
personal wishes or to approximate her views and values; in no sense
could any decision affecting such a patient effectuate her personal
choice or constitute self-determination. The court, in that situation,
devised another standard that did not look to the individual right of
self-determination or personal choice. It articulated a purely-objective test based solely on the medical condition of such a patient. 2 3
Similarly, In re Jobes"24 foreshadowed the situation of an individual
who is unknown or unknowable. 2 5 The court's decision intimates
that when health providers are confronted with this situation, the
individual interest to be protected is the right to be free from intruof self-determination can only be exercised effectively when the patient possesses enough information to make an intelligent choice. Id. at 786. In this regard, the scope of the communications are measured by the patient's needs which are material to the decision. Id. The court
concluded that "all risks potentially affecting the decision must be unmasked." Id. at 787
(citation omitted).
119. Canterbury applied the long standing common law doctrine that medical treatment
should not be administered to someone without the patient's consent. 464 F.2d at 780 & n. 15;
see, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of the N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914) (Cardozo, J.) (stating that "[elvery human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in
damages.").
120. See supra notes 54-108 and accompanying text.
121. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
122. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing the "purely-objective"
test).
123. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
124. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
125. If the patient has no family or close friends to act as a surrogate decision maker,
the court will appoint a guardian to so act. Id. at 419, 529 A.2d at 447. The court set forth
mandatory guidelines in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of the patient's personal
inclination toward withdrawal of life support, regardless of who the decision maker was. Id.
First, a hospital prognosis committee must determine if there is any reasonable possibility of
recovery to a cognitive state. Id. at 419-20, 529 A.2d at 447-48. If the committee determined
there was no possibility of recovery, life support may be withdrawn without judicial review. Id.
at 421, 529 A.2d at 448.
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sion, a right to preserve personal integrity and dignity.126
The best-interests test, with a more extended reach than the
substituted-judgment approach, has been invoked to address these
situations. 12 7 There is, however, no consensus for defining the bestinterests test. In Conroy, the court attempted to define the best-interests test in terms of balancing the benefits of continued life
against the burdens of continued treatment. 28 The court stressed,
however, that the individual interest to be protected by this standard

was not based on quality-of-life. 2 9 The test involves consideration of
objective factors such as the patient's age, prognosis, the imminence
of death, feelings of pain, level of consciousness, medical condition,
and isolation, together with the restrictions on the patient's physical

freedom and how intrusive the medical treatment has been.130 Since
the best-interest standard takes into account so many factors, it may
arguably entail a decision as to what a reasonable person in the pa3
tient's circumstances would choose.I '
126. See id. at 440-45, 529 A.2d at 457-60 (Handler, J.,concurring); Id., 108 N.J. at
448-50, 529 A.2d at 461-63 (Pollock, J., concurring); Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365, 486 A.2d at
1232; Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 200, 221-22, 741 P.2d 667, 688-89 (1986);
127. See Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 221-22, 741 P.2d at 688-89. The substituted-judgment test attempts to reach the decision the incapacitated person would make if he or she
could make a determination. Id. at 221-22, 741 P.2d at 688. This standard is guiding if the
patient has made known his or her intent while competent. Id. Using the best-interests test, the
decision-maker has to evaluate the medical treatment that would be in the patient's best interest. Id. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689.
128. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
129. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 221-22, 741 P.2d at 688-89.
130. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232. The dissent argued that the individual
interest protected by this standard involved dignity and the right to be free from intrusion. Id.
at 393-99, 486 A.2d at 1246-50 (Handler, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stressing that "a decision to focus exclusively on pain as the single criterion ignores and devalues other important ideals regarding life and death."); see also Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222,
741 P.2d at 689; Jobes, 108 N.J. at 437, 529 A.2d at 456 (Handler, J.,concurring); Id., 108
N.J. at 449, 529 A.2d at 462 (Pollock, J.,concurring); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 89, at
135; HASTINGS GUIDELINES, supra note 89, at 28-29.
131. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 89, at 136 (noting that "[w]hen a patient's
likely decision is unknown ... a surrogate decisionmaker should use the best interests standard
and choose a course that will promote the patient's well-being as it would probably be conceived by a reasonable person in the patient's circumstances."); HASTINGS GUIDELINES, supra
note 89, at 28 (explaining that "[i]f there is not enough known about the patient's direction,
preferences, and values to make an individualized decision, the surrogate should choose as to
promote the patient's interests as they would probably be conceived by a reasonable person in
the patient's circumstances, selecting from within the range of choices that reasonable people
would make."); N. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING 79 (1987) (commenting that "[t]he more oblique or distant the patient's expressions or behavior, the more decisionmakers must consider what course of treatment common human dignity suggests under the
circumstances."). But see In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 380-82, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72-73, 438
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The conceptualization of individual worth that has surfaced
with respect to a true stranger in the right-to-die cases encompasses
the concerns of dignity and privacy as distinguished from personal
autonomy or self-determination. This distinction can perhaps be
highlighted by shifting the decisional context. The case of Strachan
v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. 32 presented a situation where
parents were denied the right to reclaim the body of their dead son,

a sudden suicide, while the hospital endeavored to secure their permission to remove his organs for transplant."' The New Jersey court
concluded that the hospital, its administrator and its physicians ac-

ted unreasonably by failing to honor "the [family's] legitimate request to turn over their son's dead body.' 13 4 The court recognized
"that in reality the personal feelings of the survivors are being protected," not just a quasi-property right to bury the dead,13 5 and that

"[t]he failure of defendants to honor the family members' request
posed a plain affront to their dignity and autonomy and exposed

them to unnecessary distress at a time of profound grief."'13 The
parents were forced to view their son's dead body maintained by machines in an artificial life-like condition. 3 7 Was this not an indignity
inflicted on the boy's dead body and vicariously suffered by the parents? The severity and genuineness of the parents' emotional distress
in this context seemingly reflects our deep-seated feelings and com-

mon belief in the basic dignity that inheres in every person-an aspect of individual worth so powerful that it endures even in death.1 38
N.Y.S.2d 266, 274-76 (finding if a patient was never competent, and therefore a substituted
judgment would be impossible, life-sustaining treatment must be continued even though
"someone as close as a parent or sibling, feels that [terminating the treatment] is best for one
with an incurable disease.") cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); The New York State Task
Force on Life and the Law, Life-Sustaining Treatment: Making Decisions and Appointing a
Health Care Agent 26-27 (1987) (providing that under New York law, "[flor persons never
capable of expressing their wishes, life-sustaining treatment cannot be discontinued, whatever
burden it imposes.").
132. 109 N.J. 523, 538 A.2d 346 (1988).
133. Id. at 526-28, 538 A.2d at 347-48. The plaintiff's son was kept alive on a respirator
while the hospital, which was actively involved in organ transplants, tried to convince the parents to donate their son's organs. Id.
134. Id. at 538, 538 A.2d at 353.
135. Id. at 531, 538 A.2d at 350 (quoting W. PROSSER & W. KEEroN. supra note 51, §
12, at 631).
136. Strachan, 109 N.J. at 534, 538 A.2d at 351.
137. Id.
138. Professor Rhoden argues that "duties" are owed to persons in death. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REv. 375, 418 (1988). Professor Rhoden stresses the
need to respect the subjective wishes expressed in a "living will" or "advanced directive" and
observes the following:
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Another case suggesting that individual worth extends beyond

the values encompassed by personal autonomy is In re Grady.1"9
Grady involved a dispute over the attempted sterilization of a mentally-incompetent person.140 The New Jersey Supreme Court focused
on personal autonomy and, more specifically, individual control over
one's own reproductive capacity.' 4 ' The court defined this in constitutional terms as a "privacy right,"' 42 and explained that it was not
simply a right to obtain contraception 43 or a right to attempt procreation 14 4 but "the right to make a meaningful choice between
1 45
them."
Read literally, Grady focuses on individual worth in its dominant sense of personal autonomy or self-determination, harkening to
the decisional harbingers such as right to privacy that influenced the
Quinlan court.1 46 The court prescribed standards under which a
choice was to be made by others." 7 Because the court defined the
Someone seeking a future-oriented promise views herself as being concerned about
how her body, property, or heirs are treated in the future. The promisor in turn
incurs an obligation to see the person as the person saw herself. In other words, the
promisor now has a duty to avoid viewing the promisee objectively, reasoning "she's
a corpse now, she can't care," but rather must view her subjectively, as she saw
herself in the past and projected herself in the future.
Id.
139. 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
140. Id. at 242, 426 A.2d at 470. The parents sought sterilization for their daughter
afflicted with Down's Syndrome but were refused by the hospital. Id.
141. Id. at 248, 426 A.2d at 473.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (recognizing the right to prevent
conception).
144. Grady', 85 N.J. at 250, 426 A.2d at 474; see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (recognizing the fundamental right to procreate).
145. Grady, 85 N.J. at 250, 426 A.2d at 474.
146. Id. at 250-51, 426 A.2d at 474; see supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (discussing the right to privacy and the extent that the decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) influenced the decision of In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976)).
147. The court set forth procedures for the trial court to follow in determining whether
to authorize sterilization of an incompetent person. Grady, 85 N.J. at 264-67, 426 A.2d at
482-83. First, the ultimate duty lies with the court rather than the parents of the incompetent
person to determine if it is in the best interests of the incompetent person to undergo sterilization. Id. at 264, 426 A.2d at 482. Second, the court should appoint an independent guardian
ad litem as soon as possible; the guardian should thereafter receive independent medical and
psychological evaluations. Id. Third, the court must find that the individual lacks capacity to
make a decision about sterilization and the incapacity is unlikely to change in the foreseeable
future. Id. at 265, 426 A.2d 482-83. Fourth, the court must be persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that the sterilization is in the incompetent individual's best interests. Id. at
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individual right as "personal choice"'' 8 and effectuated the right by
authorizing others to make the choice, its rationale approximates
that of substituted judgment.'4 9 Still, the sterilization decision is to
150
be made objectively in the incompetent person's "best interests."'
This approach was not unlike the path followed by courts in some of
the right-to-die cases in which a best interest analysis was cloaked in
a substituted-judgment formulation. 5 '
266, 426 A.2d at 483; see infra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing the factors to be
evaluated in determining what is in a person's best interests).
148. Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 250-52, 426 A.2d 467, 474-75. The court recognized that the
right to choose between sterilization and procreation was constitutionally protected. Id. at 250,
426 A.2d at 474. The fact that the individual faced with the choice was incompetent "should
not result in the forfeit of this constitutional interest." Id. Therefore, when the incompetent
individual lacks the mental capacity to make the choice, the court determined that "a court
should ensure the exercise of that right on behalf of the incompetent in a manner that reflects
his or her best interests." Id. at 252, 426 A.2d at 475; see supra note 147 and accompanying
text (discussing the procedures a court must follow to determine whether to authorize the
sterilization of an incompetent).
149. The court did not "pretend that the choice of her parents, her guardian ad litem, or
a court is her own choice. But it is a genuine choice nevertheless-one designed to further the
same interests she might pursue had she the ability to decide herself." Grady, 85 N.J. at 261,
426 A.2d at 481.
150. The standard that the court prescribed for the decision concentrated solely on objective factors that related to the incompetent person's well-being. These factors included:
(I) The possibility that the incompetent person can become pregnant .... (2) The
possibility that the incompetent person will experience trauma or psychological
damage if she becomes pregnant or gives birth, and conversely, the possibility of
trauma or psychological damage from the sterilization operation ....
(4) The inability of the incompetent person to understand reproduction or contraception and
the likely permanence of that inability .... [and] (7) The ability of the incompetent person to care for a child.
Id. at 266, 426 A.2d at 483. Factors relevant to the sterilization of a mentally handicapped
person in another context would have no bearing upon the final analysis. In Grady the court
noted that the interests of the parents who could be burdened with the care of an infant, the
interests of a potential child whose fate is indeterminable, and the interests of society, were
legitimate concerns but irrelevant to the decision affecting the the mentally handicapped woman. Id. at 267, 426 A.2d at 484.
151. See, e.g., In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 320 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Hier, 18
Mass. App. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959 (1984); see also Pollack, Life and Death Decisions: Who
Makes Them and by What Standards,41 RUTGERS L. REV. 505, 525-30 (1989) (noting that
many courts use the label "substituted judgment" but actually apply the "best interests" test
when determining if life sustaining treatment should be discontinued). But see Annas, The
Case of Mary Hier: When Substituted Judgment Becomes a Sleight of Hand, 14 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 23, Aug. 1984, at 23, 25 (criticizing the court's substituted judgment standard
for incompetent persons); Annas, Quality of Life in the Courts: Earle Spring in Fantasyland,
10 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1980, at 9 (commenting that although In re Spring was
ostensibly based on substituted judgment, it "seems to have been decided on quality-of-life
considerations."); Dresser, Life, Death and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and
Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 386 (1986) (discussing how the Massachu-
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Implicit in Grady is the premise that a young woman's right of
personal autonomy and self-determination was really not at stake.'5 2
Indeed, the court referred to the individual's state constitutional
right of the pursuit of happiness. 153 By freeing her from the terror
and burdens of a pregnancy and child birth with which she could not
cope, sterilization could improve the young woman's opportunity to
live a better, happier, and more secure life-concerns that comport
fully with individual dignity, self-esteem and personal integrity.15
Viewing this constellation of decisions one can glean an emerging judicial doctrine of individual worth. Individual worth is conceptualized both in terms of personal autonomy and personal dignity.
Autonomy is perhaps the most recurrent principle of individual
worth present in judicial decisions, involving essentially the right of
self-determination and personal choice. Dignity invokes the values
inherent in the integrity of one's own personality and the right to be

free from intrusion.
Obviously these are not mutually exclusive concepts. Each has
been understood as an aspect of "privacy," a concept that traditionally has been an umbrella for a number of the interests vital to our
understanding of individuality. As noted, constitutional privacy historically has been imbued strongly with the sense of the right of personal choice or self-determination. 55 It is significant, however, that
the decisional context in which autonomy or personal choice received
setts Appellate Court "manipulated its analysis of an incompetent patient's interest to produce
a decision in conflict with the patient's apparent substituted intererests in receiving
treatment.").
152. Grady, 85 N.J. at 261, 426 A.2d at 481; see supra note 149. The court was not
pretending to know what the incompetent person's decision would be, but rather was protecting her best interests for a fulfilling life. Id. at 85 N.J. at 266-67, 426 A.2d at 483.
153. Id. at 250, 426 A.2d at 474; compare Grady, 85 N.J. at 250-52, 426 A.2d at 47475 (recognizing that the choice between sterilization and procreation is constitutionally protected) with In re Eve, 31 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (1986) (Supreme Court of Canada ruling that a
mentally retarded woman could not be sterilized). In Eve, the court determined that the "substituted judgment" test was unacceptable in that it was an "obvious fiction" to suggest that a
decision of the court was the decision of the competent. Id. at 35. The court also ruled that the
"best interests" test was not "a sufficiently precise or workable tool" in exercising the parens
patriaejurisdiction. Id. at 33. Instead, the court chose to draw the line between therapeutic
and non-therapeutic sterilization and ruled that the parenspatriae power does not extend to
authorizing non-therapeutic sterilization of the mentally retarded. Id. at 32. The court also
commented that judges are generally not well prepared to decide such cases and that it is the
role of the legislature to decide whether the sterilization of the mentally incompetent is socially
desirable. Id. at 33.
154. Accord Grady, 85 N.J. at 266-67, 426 A.2d at 483. The court noted that "[t]he
ultimate criterion is the best interests of the incompetent person." Id.
155. See supra note 58-60 and accompanying text.
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judicial consideration presented matters of extraordinary personal
physical intimacy: sexual relations,15 reproduction,' 5 7 pregnancy, 158
and childbirth. 59 These are the concerns that are most associated
with the human need and expectation of the right to be left alone.160
It is, therefore, understandable in light of the continuing influence of
these cases, that the separable strands of individual worth-auton-

omy and dignity-are frequently intertwined.
The conceptual blurring of the several aspects of individual
worth appears in the aforementioned cases. For example, it has been
observed with respect to the right-to-die cases 6 1 that when a patient's individual right to self-determination is exercised, the person
exercises the "right to privacy and personal dignity."1 62 However,

this formulation of individual worth considers "personal dignity" in
its subjective sense-in terms of the patient's own individual sense of
personal dignity. Personal dignity in this sense is simply a factor
comprising the person's subjective values, wishes and preferences. It
is an element of self-determination which undergirds personal autonomy and the substituted-judgment approach. 63

There are significant subjective and objective complexities inherent in both autonomy and dignity. These complexities, nevertheless, are important to consider when seeking to overcome the short-

comings of a purely-subjective standard, which measures selfdetermination or autonomy, as well as correcting the deficiencies of
156. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing that the right of privacy extends to a married couple's choice to use contraception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (extending the right of privacy in matters of contraception to unmarried individuals as well as married).
157. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (recognizing that the right to procreate
is constitutionally protected).
158. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a woman's right to choose to have
an abortion as part of her right to choose whether or not to procreate).
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). The Supreme Court made
clear that the right to prevent procreation by using contraceptives is grounded on the "right of
the individual married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id.
161. See supra notes 54-108 and accompanying text.
162. See. e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr.
297, 306 (1986) (observing that "[i]f a right exists, it matters not what 'motivates' its exercise."); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 358, 529 A.2d 404, 416 (1987) (stating that "[a] competent person's interest in his or her self-determination generally outweighs any countervailing
interest the State might have.").
163. See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text (discussing the substituted judgment
approach).
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an objective or best-interests test that addresses dignity.16 4
It has been suggested that subjective feelings are always relevant even with respect to the unknowable person; communal values

can be used to develop substantive criteria for addressing the subjective feelings of such persons. 05 Imputing subjective feelings becomes
the predicate for community or reasonable person standards in order
to give meaning to the basic individual values at stake.

6

It is clear, however, that personal dignity has a definition beyond its subjective meaning to the patient. "The question of dignity
is obviously separate from any claim based on autonomy. A claim
based on dignity is more amorphous, harder to ground in traditional
legal analysis and perhaps more controversial once translated into
specific criteria."' 67
An insight into dignity in its broader reach may be gained by
considering privacy in its sense of the right to be left alone. 68 This
involves more than being free to make personal decisions, although it
includes the right to make a personal choice without interference.'
Rather, this kind of privacy encompasses a right not to be interfered
with in all matters that distinctively surround one's basic individuality. 70 At its core is the notion that each individual has a personality
that is unique, a special sense of self that should be inviolate.171 Pri164. See Rhoden, supra note 138, at 377-78, 406-07. According to Professor Rhoden,
the subjective test is limited because it "views a barely conscious person as the competent
person that she was .... Id. at 396. The objective test is limited since it focuses only on "the
benefits and burdens that beset the patient in [the patient's] current state." Id. at 396-97.
Instead, a perspective of individual worth that draws on notions of dignity and privacy separate from self-determination and autonomy is necessary. Dignity and privacy include considerations of a patient's past history, values and relationships to determine that person's perception
of the present condition even in the absence of that person's explicit directive. See id. at 41315 (arguing that personal identity is founded in part by external societal forces).
165. See Minow, InterpretingRights: An Essayfor Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860,
1885 (1987).
166. Id. Professor Minow notes that "[a]utonomy . . . is not a precondition for any
individual's exercise of rights. The only precondition is that the community is willing to allow
the individual to make claims and to participate in the shifting of boundaries which define the
rights and interests among individuals." Id.
167. Bix, Book Review, 18 SETON HALL L. REv. 523, 531 (1988) (reviewing N. CANTOR, supra note 131.)
168. Justice Brandeis defined the right of privacy as "the right to be let alone." Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting).
169. L. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 15-1, at 1302 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589
(1977) when defining the right as "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions ....").
170. See L.TRIBE, supra note 25, § 15-1, at 1303.
171. Id., § 15-1, at 1303-04 (discussing privacy, personhood, and their relation to both
outward and inward-looking dimensions of personality).
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vacy protects our personalities; intrusions violate those personalities.
Personal dignity and freedom from intrusion thus complement one
another. They are integrally related dimensions of the same inherent
value.
The dignity aspect of individual worth is not as well understood
and is more elusive than the personal autonomy aspect. However,
even if the dignity dimension of individuality has escaped precise
definition, it has not escaped labels. It has been encompassed by
terms such as "privacy" and "personhood."'1 72 The difficulty we encounter in defining privacy in the sense of individual dignity is not
simply a linguistic obstacle or semantic puzzle. A genuine conceptual
complexity exists. Moreover, this complexity has practical ramifications. The inability to understand and define the sense in which privacy involves notions of dignity imperils our ability to devise standards by which we can both identify and protect this aspect of
individuality. This failure can be particularly important when the
only aspect of individuality at stake is that of dignity, as when we
are dealing with the life of a true stranger. 7 '
A partial solution to the conceptual conundrum can be extracted from our own experiences, which may suggest a subtle and
intuitive consensus about personal dignity. Thus, like the light by
which we see, personal dignity is most often appreciated only when it
is removed. The subjection of a person to a "body search," the public
exposure of a person's private diary, the uninvited scrutiny of personal items, such as one's records, writings, or things, the unexpected
gaze into a living room or bedroom window, the overhearing of an
intimate conversation, the unsolicited opening of one's mail-all of
these are examples of invasions of privacy that diminish and destroy
dignity. 17 These kinds of experiences and the universality of our reactions to them prompted Professor Bloustein, President of Rutgers
University, to characterize such intrusive conduct as an insult to the
individual, an "affront to personal dignity," and as "demeaning to
172. See generally id., ch. 15, at 1302-435 (examining the right to privacy and
personhood).
173. See supra notes 127-51 and accompanying text (discussing right-to-die cases involving true strangers and explaining the application of the "best-interests" test).
174. See Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Pros-

ser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 972-77 (1964), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 156, 163-67 (F. Schoeman ed. 1984) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL

DIMENSIONS] (categorizing these types of experiences as "intrusion cases", where the "defendant has used unreasonable or illegal means to discover something about the plaintiff's private
life.").
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individuality." 17 5
Can common experiences lead to an understanding of individual
dignity as a shared communitarian concept? Is it possible to devise
an objective or reasonable-person standard of dignity? The belief
that everyone has a basic personality that is unique and special
seems to be universal. And is it not also believed that each individual's personality is inviolate, and that every person should be granted
a modicum of dignity? Personal dignity may, therefore, be a value or
a quality that we can attribute to every individual.
The quality of dignity that society will impute to others may be
different from the sense of dignity that individuals ascribe to themselves. It may be different from each person's subjective feelings that
serve to define his or her own level of dignity. Everyone, for example,
has a different feeling about his or her own personal dignity, perhaps
measured crudely by that person's threshold of embarrassment. Is
this not what is meant by references to how thick or thin skinned a
person is? Nevertheless, every human being has basic dignity and a
concomitant entitlement to privacy, wholly apart from each person's
own subjective perception of personal dignity. Thus, it can be understood that a dead person's body should not be desecrated, that both
the exhibitionist and the voyeur have no place in society. We intuitively know that a private room need not be invaded by the uninvited
or occupied by its owner to remain private, and that one's personal
mail, whether or not read by another, is private."' 6 Awareness of the
infliction of indignity is not required for dignity to be violated anymore than hearing a tree fall in an empty forest is necessary to create sound.
These considerations suggest that dignity is not hopelessly subjective, or, indeed, only subjective. We regularly can-and
do-attribute rights of privacy and dignity to other persons. Thus,
Ferdinand Schoeman noted the observations of James Fitzjames Stephen, the English jurist and philosopher, in his classic work, Liberty,
175. Id. at 164. Professor Bloustein emphasizes the correlation between emotional distress and indignity. Id. at 165. He comments that "[a] man whose home may be entered at the
will of another, whose conversation may be overheard at the will of another, whose marital and
familial intimacies may be overseen at the will of another, is less of a man, has less human
dignity, on that account." Id. at 165. Thus, "[aln intrusion on our privacy threatens our liberty as individuals to do as we will .... The injury is to our individuality, to our dignity as
individuals .... " Id. at 187-88.
176. See Benn, Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons, in PHILOSOPHICAL DiMEN-

SIONS, supra note 174, at 224 (discussing the relation between societal norms and the conceptualization of privacy).
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Equality and Fraternity, that privacy is a shared value that relates
177
centrally to the intimate aspects of a person's life.
Perhaps what is sought to be captured through pursuit of the
apt label for this aspect of individual worth is the idea of personhood, traceable in part to the classic treatment of privacy by Justices Brandeis and Warren and their articulation of the "inviolate
personality.' 7 8 Schoeman finds the significance of this articulation
to be the connection of "[privacy] with various other values, including an individual's right to be left alone and the respect due an individual's inviolate personalty.' 79 Others have described this idea of
fundamental personality or personhood in different ways, concentrating on, for example, the individual's moral autonomy or moral title
to one's existence. 80 Stanley Benn has pointed out that there are
"realms of life that are inherently private," and "therefore deserving
of more respect."' 8'With a perception of individual worth that embraces dignity-the special sense of self ascribed to every human being-the
illustrative cases can again be examined to determine whether these
ideas have permeated or influenced decisions. If individual worth imports the notions of privacy and dignity, how can these values be
recognized and protected? Attempts to answer this perplexing question may be embedded in the courts' attempt to articulate and apply
a best-interest standard in dealing with fundamental individual interests in those situations when personal autonomy, the individual's
right of self-determination and personal choice, can in no sense be
effectuated and, therefore, is itself not at stake.' 2 We can see this
177. Schoeman, Privacy. PhilosophicalDimensions of the Literature,in PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS, supra note 174, at 10-12.
178. Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890); see
also Craven, Personhood: The Right to Be Let Alone, 4 DUKE L.J. 699-720 (1976) (evaluating
personhood in light of more recent rulings on the privacy issue).
179. Schoeman, supra note 177, at 14 (emphasis in original).
180. See Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS
supra note 174, at 310.
181. Benn, supra note 176, at 224-32. Benn explains as follows:
To respect someone as a person is to concede that one ought to take account of the
way in which his enterprise might be affected by one's own decisions. By the principle of respect for persons, then, I mean the principle that every human being, insofar as he is qualified as a person, is entitled to this minimal degree of consideration.
Id. at 229 (emphasis in original).
182. See supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text (discussing the guidelines utilized
when making medical treatment decisions where a patient's personal choice cannot be
determined).
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8 4 in which the
foreshadowed in the cases of Conroy'83 and Jobes,1
court considered the worth of the individual whose only remaining
interest concerned bodily integrity and freedom from physical intrusiveness.185 And we may find, in a case such as Strachan,86 an anal-

ogy to the wrongful intrusion cases in which the gist of the wrong is

not the intentional infliction of mental distress but rather a blow to
human dignity which is an assault on human personality. 87 Such
intrusions "are wrongful because they are demeaning of individuality."' 88 Thus, in a case such as Grady,"9 the court was truly more
concerned with the best interests and the happiness of the young wo-

man, which might be better achieved by sterilization and its resultant tranquility, than in effectuating a fictional personal choice. 190
These judicial efforts mean, even if only by implication, that in
particular settings individual worth, even in its most elusive aspect of
personal dignity, is the interest that must be preserved, and that it
may be capable of protection under a reasonably objective
standard. 91'
183. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); see supra notes 67-73, 91-101,
123, 128-29 and accompanying text (discussing Conroy).
184. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); see supra notes 85-87, 102-08,
126 and accompanying text (discussing Jobes).
185. See supra notes 92-108 (analyzing the substituted-judgment methodology articulated in the cases).
186. Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 107 N.J. 523, 538 A.2d 346 (1988);
see supra notes 131-37 (discussing Strachan).
187. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text (exploring the concept of dignity as
developed in Strachan).
188. Bloustein, supra note 174, at 165. By way of illustration, Professor Bloustein observes that "[w]hen a newspaper publishes a picture of a newborn deformed child, its parents
are not disturbed about any possible loss of reputation as a result. They are rather mortified
and insulted that the world should be witness to their private tragedy." Id. at 169. Bloustein
provides another illustration:
A woman's legal right to bear children without unwanted onlookers does not turn on
the desire to protect her emotional equanimity, but rather on a desire to enhance
her individuality and human dignity. When the right is violated she suffers outrage
or affront, not necessarily mental trauma or distress. And, even where she does undergo anxiety or other symptoms of mental illness as a result, these consequences
themselves flow from the indignity which has been done to her.
Id. at 164.
189. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981); see supra notes 139-54 (discussing
the case).
190. See supra notes 139-54 and accompanying text (interpreting Grady as a case regarding the protection of human dignity where incompetance precludes individual choice).
191. Professor Cantor suggests that "it may be possible to gradually discern acceptable
societal norms of human handling of moribund patients ....Shared notions of human dignity
will ultimately govern decision-making on behalf of incompetent moribund patients." N. CANTOR, supra note 131, at 76-77.
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Nevertheless, it would be misstating the matter to indicate that
these particular characterizations of privacy have clearly entered our
decisional law. Rather, what might be extrapolated from these cases
are judicial views reflecting a greater awareness and somewhat
sharper perception of the interests that serve to define individual
worth.
III.

JUDICIAL/NONJUDICIAL TREATMENT OF INDIVIDUAL WORTH

Against the backdrop of an emerging doctrine of individual
worth, it may be useful to consider not only what courts have said
about individual worth, but also what they have done about it. This
inquiry, as much as the judicial word, may elucidate the judicial understanding of individual worth and also define more pointedly the
role that courts have assumed in dealing with broad concerns of public policy and individual morality.
The illustrative cases provide us with different vantage points by
which to gauge the role of courts. At one level we can see that courts
can be viewed primarily in terms of adjudicating the claims of private litigants in the context of adversary proceedings. Additionally,
the courts can be seen as refraining from the definitive adjudication
of competing claims. Instead structuring a framework within which
interested parties can make these important determinations. Finally,
the judiciary can be examined in relationship to other branches of
government, formulating their decisions as a springboard for the
continuing development of the law.
By allowing recovery of damages in the wrongful birth and life
cases, courts have, in effect, recognized that the wrongful deprivation
of the right of personal choice was a wrong that should be redressed.1 92 In providing a remedy and compensation, the courts' actions were not remarkable. The decision to award compensatory
damages takes on added significance, however, when considered
against the historical refusal of courts to provide a remedy for this
kind of wrong. 193 In effect, the court would be denying that a fundamental individual right was at stake.194 The courts, however, were
unwilling to persist in such denials.
192. See supra notes 26-53 and accompanying text (surveying wrongful birth and life
cases and examining their implications in free choice terms).
193. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (citing cases which have denied wrongful
birth or life claims).
194. See supra text accompanying note 53 (interpreting the limited right of selfdetermination).
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In these particular cases the judicial role can readily be reconciled with traditional judicial functions. The courts' efforts were confined to adjudicating the claims of the private litigants. Moreover,
there is ample precedent for courts, engaging in the common law
decisional process, to find a remedy where one previously did not

exist.1" 5 The cases thus demonstrate how courts reflect changing atti-

tudes, recognizing that interests that historically did not merit protection should now be protected.
The wrongful birth and life cases also evince a greater willingness to use the legal tools of remedy and redress. In doing so, the
judiciary reflects the importance ascribed to the underlying interests
that constitute individual worth. Thus, the deprivation of personal
choice with respect to the decision to continue or discontinue a pregnancy involving a congenitally defective fetus-a portentous individual moral issue-was deemed so horrendous that it significantly outweighed the countervailing concerns engendered by the attempted

measurement of inherently speculative damages.19 Similarly, in
Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital,9 ' the court believed that the offensive treatment of the decedent's body seriously
distressed the surviving parents. 98 Their anguish arose in part from
the indignity inflicted on their son by being kept involuntarily alive
in an unnatural but life-like state.1 99 The significance of this interest
called not only for recognition of the offense-the tortious infliction
of emotional distress-but its vindication. 00 Implicit in this analysis
195. See In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 347-48, 529 A.2d 404, 418 (1987); Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1138-39, 225 Cal. Rptr 297, 301-02 (1986); see also
supra notes 109-19 (discussing the common law doctrine of informed consent).
196. See, e.g.. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (denying an
award of damages and discussing the reasons why damages could not be awarded in a wrongful life or birth action).
197. 109 N.J. 523, 538 A.2d 346, (1988); see supra notes 134-37 and accompanying
text (evaluating the case and the issue of personal dignity involved therein).
198. Id. at 534, 538 A.2d at 351.
199. Id. The court emphasized the parents' suffering:
[F]or three days after requesting that their son be disconnected from the respirator
plaintiff's continued to see him lying in bed, with tubes in his body, his eyes taped
shut, and foam in his mouth. Had Jeffrey's body been removed from the respirator
when his parents requested, a scene fraught with grief and heartache would have
been avoided, and plaintiffs would have been spared additional suffering.

Id.
200. Id. at 538, 538 A.2d at 353 (stating that "the plaintiff's need not demonstrate
physical manifestations of emotional distress" in order to recover damages). The court felt it
necessary, however, to remand for a retrial on damages. Id. at 538-39, 538 A.2d at 354. This
was necessary because the original jury had been instructed on two causes of action, where the
appellate court held that only one cause of action existed. Id.
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may be the assumption that the basis of the distress was the assault
on the dignity of the family, including, inferentially, the respect and
consideration still due the dead. In In re Grady the court was not
importuned to fashion conventional relief, but rather to exercise its
parens patriaejudicial powers to protect the well-being of a helpless

person and to identify and vindicate her critical individual interests. 20 ' It is significant that the interest involved was deemed so important, despite doctrinal ambivalence, that a remedy was fashioned. 2 The court struggled to define the interest in terms of

personal autonomy, but nevertheless devised standards calculated to

further the best interests of the young woman.20 3 It eschewed the

route later taken by the Canadian Supreme Court in In re Eve 214
and adopted a stance that provided a standard and an adjudicatory
framework for protecting the individual's well-being.205 The court
clearly evinced its concern for the person's opportunity to live a life
with dignity, security and self-esteem, thereby enhancing her
chances for personal happiness.20 6
These cases-in tort and in equity-reflect in large measure
the creative application of traditional judicial remedies in reaction to
new issues or to new perceptions of recurrent issues. In other cases,

however, we can also detect some repositioning of the judicial role.
Courts sense that the problems posed by conflicts, such as in the

right-to-die cases, are perhaps intractable, the dilemmas insolvable. 7 The way in which such problems are handled, more than
how they are solved, has become a prominent consideration.
201. See In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 266-67, 426 A.2d 467, 483 (1981) (indicating nine
factors the court must evaluate in order to find the incompetent person's best interests).
202. See id. at 250-51, 538 A.2d at 474-75 (authorizing certain parties to assert the
right of meaningful decision on behalf of the incompetent person).
203. Id. at 262-67, 426 A.2d at 481-83 (discussing the "best-interests" standard and
procedure); see supra notes 147, 150 and accompanying text (describing the standards set
forth in Grady to determine an incompetent patient's "best interests").
204. 31 D.L.R. 4th 1 (1986) (prohibiting the sterilization of a mentally retarded woman); see supra note 153 (contrasting Grady with Eve).
205. See supra note 150 (analyzing the standards set forth in Grady relating to the
individual's well-being).
206. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text (analyzing the implications of the
Grady decision).
207. See In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 429, 529 A.2d 434, 452 (1987) (Handler, J., concurring) (indicating that the issues in right-to-die cases "are intrinsic to the human condition and
thus are not susceptible to judicial resolution."); In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 343, 486 A.2d
1209, 1220 (1985) (noting that the case raised "moral, social, technological, philosophical and
legal questions involving the interplay of many disciplines. No one person or profession has all
the answers.").
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Courts have come to believe that it may be more important to
identify the right decisionmaker than it is to reach the right decision.
There has been a greater tolerance of the delegation of decisional
responsibility and as a consequence courts have started down the
road of judicial deregulation. In these cases, the courts have begun
to look to the persons or institutions most familiar with the issues
they engender and having actual day-to-day responsibility for dealing with these profound problems. 0 8
This development can be tracked by following the courts' solutions in the right-to-die cases. In the case of the fully competent patient, such as in In re Farrell°9 and Bouvia v. Superior Court,21 0 the
- Courts
patient herself is entitled to be the primary decisionmaker 11
insist that the decision be informed and voluntary, and, because the
patient's physical and mental condition is critical, that it be shared
with a physician.2 12 These decisions are paralleled by Largey, in
which the court, with greater appreciation of the importance of personal autonomy, redefined the informed consent rule with respect to
medical treatment that effectuates the patient's right of selfdetermination.21 4
The identification and selection of the appropriate decisionmakers becomes more difficult in the case of the incompetent patient. If the patient is incompetent but knowable, the court can, in
some measure, effectuate the patient's right of self-determination by
delegating decisionmaking to those who "know" the patient or to the
person to whom the patient herself delegated this responsibility, as
was done in In re Peter21 5 through an "advance directive."2 1 With
208. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (explaining that a decision made through
substituted-judgment must be shared by physicians, family members or friends, and a state
agency designed to protect the individuals in question).
209. 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); see supra notes 76-79, 88, 110 and accompanying text (discussing Farrell).
210. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal.Rptr. 297 (1986); see supra note 111-12 and ac-

companying text (reviewing Bouvia).
211. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (indicating that both Farrelland
Bouvia granted dying but competent persons their right-to-die decision based on their "in-

formed consent").
212. See, e.g. Farrell108 N.J. at 354, 529 A.2d at 413 (1987) (requiring the competent
person's decision to be "informed" and "voluntary").
213. Largey v. Rothman, I10 N.J. 204, 540 A.2d 504 (1988); see supra notes 114-16
and accompanying text (discussing Largey).
214. See Largey, 110 N.J. at 210-14, 540 A.2d at 507-09.
215. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); see supra notes 80-84, 89 (discussing In re

Peter).
216.

See supra note 89 and accompanying text (explaining the process through which an
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respect to the incompetent-probably knowable patient, such as was
arguably involved in Quinlan17 and Jobes,213 the decisionmaker will
be the person who is most likely to have relevant knowledge of the
patient, who can best understand or intuit her wishes, and who can

be trusted because of love and unselfishness to make an optimum
decision on behalf of the patient. 219' These persons will most often be
family members and close friends.220 However, the problem of structuring and allocating sound and reliable decisonmaking is infinitely
more complicated and problematic in dealing with the incompetentbarely knowable patient, as in Conroy.121 It is therefore understandable that the court devised an elaborate standard involving three possible tests which included the State Ombudsman in the decisionmaking team and which, in its third application involving objective
standards, would attempt to protect the best interests of the

patient.22
The search for the right decisionmaker must take a different
direction in dealing with the incompetent-unknowable person. Courts
and others have begun to acknowledge an imperative to help the
strangers among us. They have, inferentially, adopted a doctrine of
individual worth that encompasses personal dignity. The approach is
represented in the formulation of an objective or best-interests standard.2 23 It might be argued that when best-interests are measured by
a standard of objective reasonableness, the decision to terminate
treatment in such a case is an exercise of the patient's right of self"advance directive" is made).
217. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); see
supra notes 54-66 (discussing the case).
218. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
219. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (examining the court's decision in

Quinlan).
220. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (explaining that Karen Quinlan's father
was delegated the exercise of her right of self-determination).
221. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); see supra notes 67-73, 90-100
(discussing Conroy).
222. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text (describing the three tests articulated in Conroy).
223. See HASTINGS GUIDELINas, supra note 89, at 2-9, 18-29; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N,
supra note 89, at 2-6; see, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 222, 741 P.2d 674, 689
(1987) (stating that in the absence of evidence of a patient's wishes, the patient's "best interests would be served by the placement of DNR [do not resuscitate] and DNH [do not hospitalize] orders on her medical chart."); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 553, 747 P.2d 445, 449
(1987) (finding that even though evidence of patient's preferences was weak, the withholding
of life-sustaining treatment should be approved; the court relied on both the patient's constitutional right of privacy and her common law right to be free of bodily invasion).
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determination as viewed by a reasonable person. Nevertheless, even
as formulated, such a best-interests standard is markedly different
from an exercise of the patient's right of self-determination based on
the patient's own subjective views or wishes.
Recourse to a best-interests test arises out of necessity because
the patient is, or has become, a stranger, yielding not the slightest
clue as to her preferences concerning the medical exigencies entailed
in her continued existence. Consequently, in such necessitous straits,
a test seeking to ascertain the best-interests of the patient and
thereby preserve personal dignity should only be the test of last
resort.
Therefore, the difficulty posed in this last setting-that of the
true stranger-is that the individual interest in personal autonomy,
as expressed by self-determination or personal choice, is simply not
protectable. Knowledge of the patient's wishes is not available; it is
not possible to know or even to guess the person's wishes or personal
values. As a result, it is not possible to make an informed choice on
the patient's behalf. Hence, this aspect of individual worth cannot
realistically be vindicated. Yet, the thought that because a person is
unknown to us she has no individual worth is a notion that invites
rebellion.
The individual interests that are at stake are personal dignity or
integrity of the self, the concomitant entitlement to privacy, and
freedom from intrusion. The courts are or should be asking: How
can this interest be described or defined? When is it being violated?
Who can best protect this interest? How can the right decisionmaker
be identified in this situation? The best-interests test, which encompasses the dignity aspects of individual worth, is heavily burdened by
antecedent conceptual difficulties. Persons in a heterogeneous society
understandably have different moral values, particularly with respect
to something as basic as death. Professor Tribe has pointed out that
a best-interests test is but another form of substituted-judgment, and
that the infirmity of a best-interest test inheres in the fact that it
"imposes highly contested societal values paternalistically on the
individual. ' 2 4
224.

L. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 15-11, at 1369. Professor Cantor has formulated a deci-

sional standard based on common notions of dignity and humane treatment concerning treatment of the moribund. See N.

CANTOR,

supra note 131, at 119-23. This standard could argua-

bly be criticized "for being premature in [its] prediction of a developing consensus and perhaps
a little too optimistic about the ability of judges to find the best answers." Bix, supra note 167,
at 530.
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The lack of societal agreement counsels courts to proceed with
caution and with due respect for the continuation of life when basing
a decision of last resort on a best-interests analysis.125 The best-interests test traces its origins to the parens patriae jurisdiction of the

courts.226 Nevertheless, in this area, permitting a surrogate decisionmaker to refuse treatment for an incompetent unknowable patient implicitly recognizes that their best interests may not be served

by continuing treatment.22 7 Courts, however, have not readily recog-

nized or expressly acknowledged that they are permitting surrogates
to terminate treatment in the absence of a reliable evidence of the
patient's preferences. Such concerns have impelled courts to limit the

discretion involved by imposing countervailing conditions when the
patient's wishes are not available. These limits serve, perhaps, as a
rationalization to support and instill confidence in the final
decision. 2
Thus, in right-to-die matters, in the case of the competent patient, and in any informed-consent setting, it is the patient and doctor who are the decisionmakers.22 9 In the case of the incompetent225. As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed in Conroy, "[t]o err either way-to
keep a person alive under circumstances under which he would rather have been allowed to
die, or to allow that person to die when he would have chosen to cling to life-would be deeply
unfortunate." 98 N.J. 321, 343, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (1985). Nonetheless, it is best to err, if
at all, in favor of preserving life.
226. See, e.g., Superintendant of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
745, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977) (discussing the state's power under the doctrine of parens
patriae); Conroy, 98 N.J. at 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1231 (stating "the state's parens patriae
power supports the authority of its courts to allow decisions to be made for an incompetent
").
that serve the incompetent's best interests .
227. In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 337 (Minn. 1984) (allowing the probate court to
empower a conservator to order the removal of life support systems when they are no longer in
the patient's best interests).
228. This may be expressed as inherent limitations on the rights of individuality. Such
limitations can be traced to the decisional origins in the privacy field. Thus, Roe rejected the
view that the federal constitution vests a pregnant woman with an absolute right of procreative
choice. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Instead, the Supreme Court declared that the
right was "not absolute" so that "at some point the state interests as to protection of health,
medical standards, and pre-natal life become dominant." Id.
Similarly, in the termination-of-treatment cases, courts have viewed a patient's right to
terminate his or her treatment as constrained by state interests. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 108
N.J. 335, 352, 529 A.2d 404, 412 (1987) (stating that "[w]hen courts refuse to allow a competent patient to decline life-sustaining treatment, it is almost always because of the state's interest in protecting innocent third parties who would be harmed by the patient's decision"); Conroy, 98 N.J. at 353, 486 A.2d at 1225 (concluding that "the right to self-determination
ordinarily outweighs any countervailing state interests .... ").
229. See supra text accompanying note 88 (noting that such a result was found in
Farrell).
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knowable or barely knowable patient, it is the actually-designated
surrogate of the patient or her family or friends who, together with

the doctor, can function as decisionmakers

30

Finally, in the case of

the incompetent-unknowable patient, the doctor, responsible health-

care providers and experienced ethicists could be called on to make
or participate in the ultimate decision.2 3x If indeed privacy embraces
a common understanding of personal dignity that demands humane
and considerate treatment, and if it is founded on a shared belief in
"respect for persons," it should be possible to locate a decisionmaker
that can be unanimously accepted.
In its promulgation of standards and its placement of procedures to advance these situations, the courts' decisions can be seen as
a form of judicial deregulation, that is a cautious withdrawal of judicial oversight from the decisions of private parties. 2 2 There is
greater awareness that the conventional adversary framework is
counterproductive in achieving resolution of such issues. 233 Thus,
230. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (analyzing this result in In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 677, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)).
231. This approach was acknowledged in Quinlan, the first court nationwide to rule that
life-sustaining treatment could be legally withdrawn if the guardian and doctor's decision to
end treatment was reviewed and concurred by an ethics committee. 70 N.J. 10, 54, 355 A.2d
647, 671 (1976). Other state courts have also given some type of informal legal status to ethics
committees in the decisionmaking process. See, e.g., Superintendant of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 758-59, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434 (1977) (discussing the
desirability of the findings and advice of an ethics committee in court making a decision); In re
Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Minn. 1984) (stating that reports of Biomedical Ethics Committees were used in making the court's determination); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 13436, 660 P.2d 738, 749-50 (1983) (recommending a unanimous concurrence from a "prognosis
board or committee").
The judicial delegation of decisionmaking power to achieve better decisions has been endorsed by both the executive and legislative branches of the United States government for
limited factual situations. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 89, at 160-69 (suggesting the

use of ethics committees in decisions involving seriously ill newborns and people without a
natural surrogate); Child Abuse and Neglect Preventionand Treatment, 50 Fed. Reg. 14, 887
(1985) (advocating model guidelines for Infant Care Review Committees promulgated according to amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98
Stat. 1749 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5117(d) (Supp. IV 1986))). For a general
discussion on ethics committees and their possible use for legitimate and impartial review of
health care decisions, see Jaffe, Institutional Ethics Committees: Legitimate and Impartial
Review of Ethical Health Care Decisions, (March 11, 1988) (unpublished manuscript on file
at Hofstra Law Review).
232. See generally, Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane
Doe, 18 U. MICH. J.U REF. 933, 970-78 (1985) (discussing the differentiation between "substance" and "procedure" as a "classic" legal concern and noting that; courts can often avoid
mandating specific substantive outcomes by establishing a procedure for delegating who will
have final decisionmaking power, rather than determining what the final decision should be).
233. See id. (discussing the shortcomings of current legal models for decisionmaking to
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Professor Minow characterizes the kinds of relationships people experience when working within an adversarial context as polarized,
defensive, and distrustful. 34 She believes that an alternative framework can encourage creative, consensual decisionmaking, and that it
can expand the range of choices available.23 5 It may be necessary to
expand knowledge and communication by focusing on "ambivalence" in order to make explicit the problems and conflicts each interested party has when making a decision.236
Decisionmaking in this framework should also be informed by
an understanding of the "connection" between the decisonmaker and

the person affected, even when those connections or relationships
themselves may be riddled with ambivalence." 7 This is true because
there is no other available standpoint, including a court's, that is not
rooted in ambivalence. 38 By exposing and confronting ambivalence
about developing objective criteria based on concerns over relief
from pain or, in the alternative, based on the relationship that intrusive bodily invasion has to a person's dignity, the necessity for articulating criteria for "distrust" becomes more apparent.
Thus, when we do not know the patient's actual wishes, the
most important judicial decision is deciding on who is a trustworthy
decisionmaker and in what structure the decision should be
reached-not what decision should be made. Instead of arrogating
cope with the issues involved in withdrawing life support from a defective newborn); see also J.
Handler, Dependent People, The State, and the Modern/PostmodernSearch for the Dialogic
Community, 35 UCLA L. Rav. 999 (1988) (analyzing the weaknesses inherent in using traditional legal principles to govern "dependent" relationships involving doctors and patients, students with special educational needs, and the elderly poor).
234. Minow, supra note 232, at 934-35.
235. Id. With regard to the withdrawal of life support form defective newborns, Professor Minow suggests a more productive alternative to a "polarized" decisionmaking structure
might emerge by confronting sources of conflict and ambivalence the newborn's parents experience in a context in which the parents are not "blamed" for these feelings. Id. at 934, 9981004; see also J. Handler, supra note 233, at 1042-49 (exploring alternative problem-solving
structures that emphasize cooperation, flexibility, and contextualization in order to expand and
improve alternative solutions).
236. Minow, supra note 232, at 1000.
237. Id., at 940-98 Professor Minow notes that sources of distrust and ambivalence for
the public's reaction to the parents of Baby Jane Doe lie in an identification with the ambivalence that parents experience in their position as "separate" but "connected" to the child. Id.
Professor Minow suggests responding to this identification by creating conditions for trusting
the parents' ability to make the right decision, rather than by removing them from the decision
altogether. Id. at 998-1008.
238. See id. at 990-94 (arguing that human beings identify with the extreme vulnerability of the newborn and/or the awesome responsibility and pain of the parents, and therefore,
cannot be free from "ambivalence").
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decisional responsibility over answering these fundamental questions
in the concrete, the courts have moved toward a "procedural" solution involving the delegation of this responsibility to other individuals
and institutions. 39 Professor Handler has stressed the dynamics of
such innovative decisionmaking, which requires establishing conditions in which communication, trust, and participation can flourish-fostering a "dialogic community. '240 Under ideal circumstances, the full participation of interested parties would be assured,
the expression and exchange of all views would be encouraged, and
mutual respect would be required. Surely though, the fulcrum for
such a communicative/decisional process must remain the dignity of
the individual whose well-being is at stake. However, instead of
treating potential decisionmakers with skepticism or hostility in an
effort to protect the "unknowable" patient's dignity, there is a need
to develop both a basis for trust and confidence in the decisionmakers' relationship to one another, and connection to and identification with that "unknowable" patient; and a need to create a
structure that will encourage full exposure of considerations relevant
to any decision.
Finally, judicial withdrawal or deregulation has taken another
form. These cases underscore the role of the courts in relation to
other branches of government and social institutions. Courts understand that, although it is necessary for them to act in a given case or
controversy, the subjects of these disputes have significant implications that can eclipse the interests of the individual litigants. The
dilemma that confronts the judiciary in its exercise of authority is
that these contemporary legal disputes present both the conflicting
claims of litigating parties which must be settled and broad issues of
239.

See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text (examining the procedural choice

of decisionmaker in right-to-die cases).
240. See Handler, supra note 233, at 1108-13 (advocating structures for decisionmaking
based on "trust," "power-sharing" and "participation," and defining these structures as a "dia-

logic community"). This is similar to Professor Minow's analysis, where "trust" can only be
developed after confronting sources of "distrust," Minow, supra note 232, at 998-1004, Handler's analysis is directed toward expanding decisional power by confronting, and not by ignoring, power inequalities. Handler, supra note 233, at 1009. Professor Handler criticizes traditional legal rights analysis directed toward treating people "equally" for failing to take account
of palpable inequalities and great maldistributions in power. Id., at 1108-09. His analysis demonstrates how these inequalities in power were compounded by polarized decision-making
structures that sought to protect clients by "objectifying" their needs. Id. In fact, however,

these "dependent" clients required a discretionary subjective approach not built on equality in
the abstract, but on individual treatment in the concrete. Id.; see also J.HANDLER, THE CONDITIONs oF DISCRETION (1986) (amplifying these themes).
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public policy, which are most suitably addressed by others.""1
These decisional dramas have an added impact because they
can serve to arouse a quiescent legislature. They may not only goad
legislatures to move in areas of political peril, but also cause a reordering of legislative priorities. 2 In addition, because the subject
matter of these cases is inescapably controversial and the issues indelibly moral, any judicial resolutions will appear to be aggressive
and overreaching.
That appearance, however, is misleading. Courts have not made
any preemptive strikes. The judiciary has acted boldly, but has remained mindful of the legislative competence to deal with this kind
of subject matter.243 Courts in this arena have not been timid or
hesitant to exercise their judicial authority in the pursuit of proper
solutions to difficult issues raised by cases that hinge on the evaluation and protection of individual worth. However, they have at the
same time been prepared to encourage and accommodate legislative
responses, understanding that societal consensus must be reached for
more enduring resolutions of the profound social issues that have
given rise to these unique legal controversies.
IV.

CONCLUSION

What general conclusions can be drawn from this experience?
Do these cases represent the crystallization of a distinctive legal doctrine of individual worth? The doctrine may be found in the cluster
of values that courts posit as constituting the most significant aspects
of individuality or individual worth. One aspect is personal autonomy, the right of self-determination and personal choice.2 44 Another
aspect is individual dignity, the right to preserve one's intrinsic worthiness and the concomitant right to be left alone and free from intrusion. 24' The doctrine is distinctive not because it is original or
novel, but rather because it is becoming better understood, more
241. See Handler, supra note 14, at 24-25 (1987) (analyzing the relative positions of the
legislature and the judiciary in relation to right-to-die cases).
242. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31-32 (1982).
243. See In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 341-43, 529 A.2d 404, 407 (1987) (recognizing
that the legislature is the proper branch "to set guidelines in this area .... "); In re Peter, 108
N.J. 335, 341-43, 529 A.2d 419, 429 (1987) (recognizing that the legislature is the appropriate branch); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 344-45, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220-21 (1985) (indicating
that "the Legislature is better able than any other social institution to reflect the social values
at stake .... "). But see Moore, supra note 66, at 993-97 (questioning whether the courts'
deference to the legislature is appropriate).
244. See supra notes 53-130 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 131-60 and accompanying text.
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widely applied, and more effectively used.
It is important to note, however, that the dimension of individual worth that encompasses the concept of dignity has not been consistently recognized or fully explained in the right-to-die and other
cases. These cases have thus far given primary emphasis to personal
autonomy as expressed through self-determination and personal
choice. However, these decisions do point to considerations that are
relevant when it may not be possible to make a determination based
on personal autonomy because one cannot know the person's wishes,
views, or feelings.246 Of overarching importance is the belief, implicit
in the case law, that individual worth is intrinsic; it cannot be 24lost
7
even though personal autonomy is beyond our protective reach.
Another conclusion that we can fairly draw concerning the judicial perception of individual worth is that courts are willing to protect these values. This can be seen in a willingness, in appropriate
cases, to award compensatory damages to redress this interest when
it has been violated. 248 This can also be seen in the court's understanding that these interests require protection and effectuation, not
merely vindication in the form of compensatory remedies.24 9 In many
cases when compensation is irrelevant or meaningless, courts, in exercising their equity instincts, have pursued solutions that attempt to
leave the individual with essential autonomy and dignity, no matter
how dismal the person's physical and mental condition.25 °
The role of the courts may also be shifting. With respect to the
judicial function, it is important to take into account the easy and
ready criticism that courts are being pugnacious and too activist. It
is possible to rejoin by urging that courts are doing what they have
always done. The judicial function has not changed-the problems,
the issues and controversies have changed. The function of the courts
is to adjudicate cases and controversies properly brought before
them. While a court is not an orphanage for foundling cases, when
cases land at the courthouse steps, they must be taken in. This has
meant that in many situations the court has been called on to reach
decisions on matters with respect to which there has not yet evolved
a societal consensus. 51 It is, therefore, understandable that judicial
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 161-90 and accompanying text.
text accompanying notes 182-91.
supra notes 26-53 and accompanying text.
supra notes 25-52 and accompanying text.
supra notes 54-108 and accompanying text.
supra notes 52-159 and accompanying text.
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resolution of such a matter stirs controversy and perhaps resentment.
The court's willingness to turn to other decisionmakers is a form
of judicial deregulation. The judiciary has recognized that others
may be more competent and trustworthy in terms of reaching right
or acceptable decisions. 52 Courts in similar fashion have acknowledged that other branches of government, as well as social institutions, can more suitably deal with the broader range of policy concerns.2 53 In presenting these legal dramas, courts fulfill their
traditional adjudicative role, but in a manner conducive to the
broader institutional treatment and resolution of the difficult social
and moral questions. By inviting larger participation in the resolution of the issues posed by cases that come to the courthouse by default, courts serve as social catalysts rather than social arbiters.
Is there some direction or guidance for the future? The right-todie cases involving the incompetent and unknowable patient will impel courts to deal with notions of individual worth, personal dignity
and fundamental humanity. The notions of individual worth will be
presented by other cases as well. The challenge continues to grow as
we consider the troubling issues that are being generated by the survival of profoundly impaired newborns and other medical and biological advances that have engendered new forms of artificial procreation, gestation, and parental surrogacy. In such cases, courts will be
required to consider whether there can be a collective judgment or
an objective assessment of the intangible values that provide a sense
of individual worth. From current experiences, it can be expected
that courts will not only conscientiously try to deal with the challenge, but will also be mindful that the challenge is one to be taken
up by all of society.

252.
253.

See supra notes 208-43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 51, 90-99 and accompanying text.
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